We prove that a su¢cient condition for the core existence in a n-…rm vertically di¤erentiated market is that the qualities of …rms' products are equispaced along the quality spectrum. This result contributes to see that a fully collusive agreement among …rms in such markets is more easily reachable when product qualities are not distributed too asymmetrically along the quality ladder.
Introduction
The main aim of this note is to prove that a su¢cient -albeit not necessary -condition for the core existence in a partition function game associated to a n-…rm version of the classical vertically di¤erentiated market (e.g., Mussa and Rosen 1978 , Gabszewicz and Thisse 1979 ,1980 is that the qualities of products sold by the …rms are equispaced along the quality spectrum. In addition, we show that, when this regularity condition is relaxed, the core can be easily empty.
There exist very few contributions dealing with the existence of core in oligopoly games with heterogeneous …rms. 1 Our result contributes to see that a fully collusive agreement among …rms in such markets is more easily reachable when the product qualities are not distributed too asymmetrically along the quality ladder.
Date: December 2016. Jean J. Gabszewicz Marini and Ornella Tarola (2016) "Core in Vertically Di¤erentiated Markets", Economics Letters, 149, 28-32. We are grateful to the editor Roberto Serrano, to two anonymous reviewers and to Rabah Amir, Sergio Currarini, Sébastien Mitraille and to the participants in Oligo Workshop 2016 in Paris Dauphine and in EARIE 2016 Conference in Nova Universidade de Lisbon for their useful comments and suggestions. 1 Zhao (2013) examines the existence of -, -and -core in a three-…rm linear Cournot oligopoly with di¤erent marginal costs. In a di¤erentiated quantity oligopoly with three (or four …rms) Watanabe and Matsubayashi (2013) show that for any degree of product di¤erentiation the core is nonempty while the -core only exists in presence of high product di¤erentiation. For a more detailed account of the works dealing with coalitional agreements in oligopoly games, see Marini 2009 and Currarini and Marini 2015 Given that the vertical di¤erentiated market is a setting with strategic interdependence, the most appropriate coalitional game derived from it is a game in partition function (Thrall and Lucas 1963) . This in line with the recent interest in coalitional games with externalities (see, e.g., Maskin 2003 , Ray 2007 , Hafalir 2007 , de Clippel and Serrano 2008, Bloch and van den Nouweland 2014, Ray and Vohra 2015) . It is well known that, when externalities are at work across coalitions, the use of a coalitional worth requires some assumptions on the expected behaviour of players outside every deviating coalition. In such cases, core allocations may fail to exist even in convex games, for instance when players in the complementary coalition are expected to remain together, as in the delta core (Hart and Kurz 1983) , also denoted projection core in the recent axiomatization by Bloch and van den Nouweland 2014. Moreover, since in the case of vertically di¤erentiated markets the coalitional worth possesses positive coalition externalities, 2 the delta or projection-core is the smallest core and, therefore, its existence implies the existence of all other possible versions of core in games with simultaneous moves. In this paper, we use this notion of core to provide the strongest existence result for the class of games considered here.
Vertically Differentiated Market
Let n …rms i = 1; 2; :::; n o¤er n quality variants q 1 ; q 2 ; :::; q n , respectively, with q i 2 (0; 1) and q n > q n 1 > ::: > q 1 to a population of consumers. As in Mussa and Rosen (1978) consumers are indexed by and uniformly distributed in the interval [0; ], with < 1. As usual, the parameter captures consumers' willingness to pay for quality. Each consumer can either buy one unit of a variant or not buying at all. Formally, consumer's utility is given by
where p i 2 [0; p] with 0 < p < 1 is the price charged by …rm i for its variant q i . From the above formulation, the marginal consumer buying variant i = 1 is
and the market is uncovered, with some consumers excluded from buying even the bottomquality variant. In general, the consumer indi¤erent between buying variant i 1 and i is, for i = 2; 3; :::; n i =
with p i > p i 1 . When considering price competition, the payo¤s of all …rms can be easily characterized by the payo¤ of three types of …rms in the quality spectrum: (i) top quality (ii) intermediate quality and (iii) bottom quality …rm. Since in the model product qualities are exogenously given, we disregard costs to simplify calculations. 3 The top quality …rm (denoted i = n) sets a price p n maximizing its pro…t (2.2) n = p n p n 1 q n q n 1 p n ;
whereas every intermediate …rm i = 2; 3; :::; n 1 selects a price p i to maximize
Finally, the bottom quality …rm (i = 1), sets a price p 1 to maximize
Note that, from (2.2)-(2.4), …rms' pro…t functions are continuous and concave in their own prices. Moreover, …rms' choice sets are compact and convex and best-replies are contractions, 4 so the existence of a unique (noncooperative) Nash equilibrium n-price vector p associated to the n variants (q 1 ; q 2 ; :::; q n ) is guaranteed for any (…nite) number of …rms competing in the market. 5 Moreover, the optimal reply of every …rm is given by (2.6) p n (p n 1 ) = p n 1 + 2 (q n q n 1 )
for the top-quality …rm (i = n)
for all intermediate …rms i = 2; 3; :::; (n 1) and
for the bottom-quality …rm i = 1, where = = 1=2 at the noncooperative equilibrium, = = 1 both under full collusion and when a …rm lies inside a coalition of …rms, and = 1=2 and = 1 (or = 1 and = 1=2) when a …rm competes with its left (right) neighbour and colludes with its right (left) neighbour. This implies that every …rm bene…ts from rivals' cartelisation and the coalitional worth (joint pro…t) of …rms exhibits positive coalitional externalities: from (2.6)-(2.8) it ensues that all …rms' optimal replies are positively sloped and their slope increases with (partial or full) collusion. Thus, rivals' cartelisation increases all …rms' prices and, hence, their payo¤s.
Grand Coalition Payo¤.
When all …rms form a cartel they maximize the sum of …rms' payo¤s. As shown in Gabszewicz et al. (2016) , under full price collusion all …rms set prices p c i such that their market shares are nil for all …rms but the top-quality one (i = n). This is is easy to show. Using (2.6)-(2.8) with = = 1 for all …rms, the following price is obtained
4 A su¢cient condition for the contraction property to hold is (see, for instance, Vives 2000, p.47):
which, using (2.3) for all intermediate …rms i = 2; :::; n 1, becomes
which is respected for q n > q n 1 > ::: > q 1 . The same applies for top and bottom quality …rms. 5 See, for instance Friedman (1991), p.84.
where j = (q j q j 1 ) is the quality gap of every …rm j selling goods of lower or equal quality than …rm i, and 1 = (q 1 q 0 ) = q 1 . Inserting (2.9) in every …rm's market share D i , we obtain:
for the bottom quality …rm,
for any intermediate quality …rm, and
for the top quality …rm. Thus, when colluding together all …rms cover only half of the market and the grand coalition payo¤ is: In the next proposition, we characterize the variants produced by the …rms belonging to: Proposition 1 enables to characterize the number of variants marketed by the …rms in any feasible partition P = (S 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S m ) for m n and will be used extensively to prove the main paper result.
Core stability
This section analyses the stability of full price collusion, i.e. the situation in which all …rms in the industry collude in prices. In particular, the next proposition shows that, when all …rms' quality variants are equispaced (i.e. spaced at equal distance), it is always possible to …nd a division of the monopoly pro…t which makes the whole industry cartel stable against individual or coalitional deviations by …rms.
We can formally associate to the described vertically di¤erentiated market a partition function game G = (N; v (S; P )), where N is the set of …rms and v(S; P ) : 2 N P ! R is the worth associated to every coalition of …rms S N embedded in a partition P 2 P, where P is the set of all feasible partitions of the N …rms. We can now de…ne the core of a partition function game.
De…nition 2. A vector of payo¤s
is in the core of the partition function game G if, for every S N and every partition P in which S can be embedded, P i2S x i v (S; P ). We are now ready to prove our main result: Proposition 2. Let market variants q 1 ; q 2 ; :::; q n be equispaced with (q i q i 1 ) = 2 (0; 1) for every i = 1; 2; :::; n, and q 0 = 0. Then, the core of the partition function game G associated to the n-…rm vertically di¤erentiated market is nonempty.
Proof. In our model of vertical di¤erentiation, when a coalition of …rms S N forms, its maximal coalitional payo¤ is obtained when the remaining …rms in N S stick together in the complementary coalition fN Sg. Therefore, if the core is nonempty when the coalitional worth v(S; P ) is computed for P = fS; N Sg, it will a fortiori be nonempty under any other partition P 2 P in which S can be embedded. For this reason, in what follows, we only need to prove that there exists an allocation x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) of the grand coalition payo¤ v(N ) such that, for all S N , P i2S x i v (S; fS; N Sg). In particular, we prove this result by constructing a speci…c allocation respecting this requirement. Since the payo¤ obtained by every …rm i in partition P = fi; N ig is crucial to build such allocation, let us start from it. We consider …rst the payo¤ of the top quality …rm (denoted i = n), in partition P = fn; N ng. In this case, by Proposition 1, only two variants remain on sale, q n from …rm n and q n 1 from the remaining …rms merged in the bottom cartel S B = fN ng. As a result, in the new equilibrium under equispaced variants 7 (3.1) v(n; fn; N ng) = fn;N ng n = 4 2 q 2 n (q n q n 1 ) (4q n q n 1 ) 2 = 4 2 n 2 (3n + 1) 2 :
As a second step, let us consider the payo¤ of the bottom-quality …rm in partition P = f1; N 1g. By Proposition 1, in this case only three variants remain on sale, q 1 , q 2 and q n , where q 2 and q n are o¤ered by the …rms merged in the top cartel S T = fN 1g. In this new equilibrium, the payo¤ obtained by …rm i = 1 is
Finally, let us consider the payo¤ obtained by every intermediate …rm i = 2; :::; n 1 in partition P = fS B ; i; S T g, where S B and S T are the bottom and top cartel neighbouring …rm i. In this case, at most four variants remain on sale, namely q i 1 from S B , q i from i and q i+1 and q n from S T , yielding:
Now, using (2.10) and 
and the latter expression holds with strict inequality for any number of …rms n 2.
Let us now construct a speci…c allocation b x = (b x 1 ; b x 2 ; :::; b x n ) assigning to every …rm i = 1; 2; :::; n a share s i of the grand coalition payo¤ v(N ) equal to
; such that P i2N s i = 1, that is implying that the selected allocation b x 2R n is robust against any individual …rm's deviations. As a second step, we need to look at the payo¤ obtained by any feasible coalition of …rms. Let us assume again that every forming coalition expects the remaining …rms to stick together in the complementary coalition (delta or projection expectations). As a result, when a coalition of …rms in a bottom cartel S B N forms under partition P = fS B ; N S B g, by Proposition 1 only variants q h ; q h+1 and q n remain on sale (q h from S B and q h+1 and q n from fN S B g), where q h denotes the highest quality variant in S B . The worth of any bottom cartel S B is, therefore,
From (3.5) and (3.6), for every
writes, under equispaced variants, as
and (3.7) holds with strict inequality for every number of …rms n and for every h = 2; :::n 1.
x i , the joint payo¤ assigned by allocation b
x 2R n to members of S B . When, in turn, a top cartel S T N forms under partition P = fS T ; N S T g, only three variants remain on sale, q l 1 from N S T and q l and q n from S T , for l denoting the lowest quality …rm in S T . Hence, under equispaced variants,
Note that this expression is decreasing in l, since the highest l the smaller is the size of the top cartel S T . Now, for every S T N ,
under equispaced variants corresponds to
l(l + 1) (3l + 4) 2 + 1 4 (3l + n + 3l n 3l 2 ) (3l + 1) ;
which holds with strict inequality for every number of …rms n and every l = 2; :::n 1. 
that, under equispaced variants, can be written as fS B ;S I ;S T g S I = 1 16
2 (3l 2 6l 3hl h 1) (3l 2 3l 3hl h)
Thus, for every S I N X
which, again, holds for any number of …rms n and for any l = 2; :::n 2 and h = 3; :::; n 1, with l < h. As a result, the selected allocation b
x distributes the grand coalition payo¤ in a way that no coalition of …rms S N can, by leaving the grand coalition N , obtain a better payo¤. The core is, therefore, nonempty.
3.1. Endogenous Qualities. It can be shown that, when N = f1; 2; 3g, the core is nonempty also when …rms are allowed to select endogenously both qualities and prices. Following Gabszewicz et al. (2015) , the grand coalition sets endogenously a product quality q fN g = 0:25 and, hence, v(N ) = 0:03125 , which is su¢cient to prevent individual deviations, given that: v(N ) = 0:03125 > v(1; f1; 23g)+v(2; f2; 13g)+v(3; f12; 3g) = 0:00152 +0:00152 +0:02443 :
Moreover, there exist allocations x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ) distributing v(N ) in such a way that no coalition S N , by selecting its optimal quality and price, has an incentive to deviate. Using our sharing rule s = (s 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 ) = (0:0533; 0:0533; 0:8893), we obtain that X and the core is, therefore, nonempty. However, it can be shown that, with only three …rms, the nonemptiness of core always holds for any distribution of product qualities. For core emptiness to arise, the presence in the market of at least four …rms are required, as the next example will show. 
Note that, for = 1, q 1 = 1, q 2 = 5 and q 4 = 10 and q 3 > 7: 26, the quality gap between q 2 and q 3 (both produced inside the cartel) becomes su¢ciently high for and also the other deviations by single or coalitions of …rms cannot in any way improve upon the grand coalition payo¤. Core existence is, in such a way, re-established.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that in a vertically di¤erentiated market when the variants marketed by the …rms are equispaced, a fully collusive agreement in prices is core-stable. When this regularity condition is relaxed, the core can be easily empty. Proof. (Gabszewicz et al. 2016) . We …rst prove (ii) and then the proof easily extends to (iii) and, with slight modi…cations, to (i).Take a generic intermediate cartel S I N made of k …rms, with k jN 2j. Before the cartel is formed, these …rms are selling variants denoted (q i ; q i+1 ; q i+2 ; :::; q i+k ) and competing with, in turn, a left-hand fringe of independent …rms selling lower quality variants q 1 ; q 2 ; :::; q i 1 , and with a righ-hand fringe selling higher quality variants q i+k+1 ; q i+k+2 ; :::; q n . The optimal-replies of …rms in the cartel can be written as, respectively, 
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
where only the two extreme …rms i and i + k in the cartel are directly competing with …rms outside. Without loss of generality, take a generic …rm inside the cartel selling an intermediate variant (i.e neither the bottom nor the top quality in the cartel), say …rm i + 1.
Using both the optimal reply of …rm i + 1 and those of the …rms connected to it (i.e. …rms i and i + 2) and re-arranging, we obtain the optimal replies of these three …rms as functions of p i 1 and p i+3 only.
Using the above, we can easily compute the optimal market share of …rm (i + 1) as
which proves that under partial collusion every intermediate …rm of an intermediate cartel obtains zero market share. Repeating now the same procedure for the …rm producing the lowest quality in the cartel (here …rm i), we obtain instead that
Finally, computing the optimal replies of the highest quality …rm in the cartel, i.e. …rm (i + k), and of the …rms directly connected to it, we obtaiñ p i+k 1 (p i+k 2 ; p i+k ) = p i+k 2 (q i+k 1 q i+k 2 ) + p i+k (q i+k 1 q i+k 2 ) q i+k q i+k 2 p i+k (p i+k 1 ; p i+k+1 ) = p i+k 1 (q i+k+1 q i+k ) + 1 2 p i+k+1 (q i+k q i+k 1 ) q i+k+1 q i+k 1 p i+k+1 (p i+k ; p i+k+2 ) = 1 2 p i+k (q i+k+2 q i+k+1 ) + p i+k+2 (q i+k+1 q i+k ) q i+k+2 q i+k :
Using the above,
showing that only the variants produced by the two …rms at the extremes of this (generic) intermediate cartel are sold at prices implying positive market shares.
(iii) Exactly the same procedure can be replicated to prove that, in a top cartel S T N only the highest and lowest quality variants initially sold by the cartel remain on sale. (i) Finally, let us consider a bottom cartel S B N , i.e. a cartel formed by …rms 1; 2; :::; k initially selling k variants q 1 ; q 2 ; ::::q k and competing with (n k) independent …rms selling higher quality variants q k+1 ; q k+2 ; :::; q n . Again, we can apply the same argument used above to show that every …rm in the interior of the cartel (i.e neither selling its lowest quality nor its highest quality variant in the cartel) obtains zero market share. Also, for the top quality …rm in the cartel (here …rm k), we obtain that D k (p k ;p k 1 ;p k+1 ) > 0: Finally, when considering the …rm selling the lowest quality variant in the bottom cartel, its market share is: D 1 (p 2 ; p 1 ) = p 2 p 1 q 2 q 1 p 1 q 1 = 0;
that, by simply substituting …rm 1 optimal reply p 1 (p 2 ) = q 1 q 2 p 2 becomes D 1 (p 2 ;p 1 ) = p 2
showing that, di¤erently from all other cartels, the bottom cartel only produces its top-quality variant q k .
